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THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS-
THE FIRST YEAR*
WILLIAm B. AycocK**
I. ScoPE OF REvIEw
There are three judicial bodies in the military legal system: The
court-martial (trial court), the board of review (intermediate appellate
forum) and the Court of Military Appeals (appellate court)1. The
Court of Military Appeals, consisting of three civilian judges, 2 officially
began operating on July 25, 1951.3 The primary purpose of this article
is to survey the work of the Court during its first year of operation.4
The Uniform Code of Military Justice 5 provides that the Court of
Military Appeals shall review the record in the following cases:
(1) All cases in which the sentence, as affirmed by a board of
review, affects a general or flag officer or extends to death;
(2) All cases reviewed by a board of review which the Judge
Advocate General orders forwarded to the Court of Military
Appeals for review ;6 and
* Although the first year would be technically for the period May 31, 1951
to May 31, 1952, the Court was not organized until July 25, 1951. In this paper
the first year will be considered for the period July 25, 1951 through July 25,
1952. Actually the first written opinion published by the Court was on Novem-
ber 8, 1951.
**Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
IInitial review is by the convening authority. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
UNITED STATES (1951) Ch. XVII, hereafter referred to as MANUAL. The Judge
Advocate General performs certain functions in connection with review of courts-
martial cases, but his powers are not so broad as to make him a separate appellate
forum. United States v. Reeves, No. 453 (May 15, 1952).
All opinions of the Court of Military Appeals will be cited in the volume
and page of the Court Martial Reports in which they appear. If the opinion is
available only in advance sheets, the docket number and date will be cited.
The three members are Chief Judge Robert E. Quinn, former Governor of
Rhode Island and judge of the superior court; Judge George W. Latimer, former
Associate Justice of the Utah Supreme Court; and Judge Paul W. Brosman,
former Dean of Tulane University School of Law. All three judges have had
military experience-Chief Judge Quinn in the Navy; Judge Latimer in the Army;
and Judge Brosman in the Air Force. They were appointed to the Court on
June 20, 1951. 1 CMR VII (1951).
'Walker, The United States Court of Military Appeals: A Long Overdue
Addition to the Judiciary, 38 A.B.A.J. 567 (1952).
'Current articles in this general field are: Wurfel, Military Due Process,
6 VAN. L. RFv. (December, 1952); Landman, One Year of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice: A Report of Progress, 4 STAN. L. REv. 491 (1952); Com-
ment, 50 MIcH. L. REV. 1084 (1952); Latimer, Military Justice, 45 LAw LIB. J.
148 (1952).
Act of May 5, 1950, 64 STAT. 108, 50 U.S.C. §§ 551-736, hereafter referred
to as the Code.
'The Government may use this device to seek reversal of a board of review
in cases where a board of review has reversed a verdict of the court-martial for
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(3) All cases reviewed by a board of review in which, upon
petition of the accused and on goad cause shown, the Court
of Military Appeals has granted a review.
7
The extent of review in each of these three categories is further defined
by Congress:
(1) The Court of Military Appeals shall act only with respect
to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening
authority and as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by
the board of review.
(2) In a case which the Judge Advocate General orders for-
warded to the Court of Military Appeals, such action need
be taken only with respect to the issues raised by him.8
(3) In a case reviewed upon petition of the accused, such action
need be taken only with, respect to issues specified in the
grant of review.9
The right of an accused to petition the Court for review is subject to
waiver only through failure actually to exercise the right. Any agree-
ment executed by the accused purporting to waive this right is a "legal
nullity."' 0
Unlike the convening authority 1 and the board of review, 12 the
Court is not authorized to review questions of fact. Congress specifical-
ly provided that the Court "shall take action only with respect to matters
of law. '1 3 A further limitation was imposed by Congress in the form
of the so-called "harmless error" rule. A substantial number of the
cases decided by the Court during its first year have been concerned
with an interpretation of the manner in which the Court should operate
within this framework.
II. APPLICATION OF THE HARMLESS ERROR RULE
A. Iztroduction
Violations of the provisions of either the Code or the Manual con-
stitute error as a matter of law.' 4 But it does not follow that all errors
will result in the Court ordering a rehearing. Each error must be
tested in the light of the provisions of the "harmless error" rule:
an error of law. United States v. Lucas, (No. 7) 1 CMR 19 (1951); United
States v. Sturmer (No. 24) 1 CMR 17 (1951).
7 CODE, Art. 67b.
'In United States v. Castillo, No. 449 (May 2, 1952) adv. op. p. 8, the Court
stated "We have never hesitated to go beyond the question proposed by the Judge
Advocate General on the exercise of our certificate jurisdiction, but have sought to
review the entire record with care." Accord, United States v. Herndon, No. 570
(July 17, 1952).
' CoD, Art. 67d.
"0United States v. Ponds, No. 491 (May 9, 1951).
11 CODE, Art. 64.
2 CODE, Art. 66c.
" CODE, Art. 67d." United States v. Lucas (No. 7) 1 CMR 21 (1951).
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"A finding or sentence of a court-martial shall not be held
incorrect on the ground of an error of law unless the error
materially prejudices the substantial rights of the accused." 15
Judge Brosman observed that this provision, as well as similar federal
and state legislation, grew out of a fear that appellate courts in criminal
cases had become "impregnable citadels of technicality." In stating
the object of "harmless error" legislation the Court referred to the
language of Mr. Justice Rutledge in United States v. Kotteakas:
".... To substitute judgment for automatic application of rules;
to preserve review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential
unfairness in trials, but at the same time to make the process
perform that function without giving men fairly convicted the
multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid and minutely
detailed scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure,
will engender and reflect in a printed record."' 6
In making its initial determination of the test to employ in applying the
"harmless error" rule, the Court again relied on the Kotteakas case:
" . . The test must be what effect the error had or reasonably
might be taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The cru-
cial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds
of other men, not on one's own, in the total setting.
If when all is said and done; the conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the ver-
dict and the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the
departure is from a constitutional norm or a specific command of
Congress . . . The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was
enough to support the result apart from the phase affected by the
error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had sub-
stantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave -doubt, the
conviction cannot stand.' 7
The application then of the "harmless error" rule indicates the neces-
sity for finding of specific prejudice; that is, to use the language of the
Court of Military Appeals, "prejudice operating against the accused"
in a particular case.' 8  However, as will be subsequently shown, specific
prejudice is not necessarily synonymous with actual prejudice.19
Inasmuch as the court-martial also sentences the accused, it is nec-
' CODE, Art. 59a.
"' United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952), quoting from Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 760 (1946).
" United States v. Lucas (No. 7) 1 CMR 21 (1951), quoting from Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 764-765 (1946).
"8United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952).
"United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952); United States v.
Clark (No. 190) 2 CMR 107 (1952) ; United States v. Hemp (No. 290) (April 8,
1952) (error "may have" affected the findings); United States v. Bound (No.
201) 2 CMR 130 (1952) ("probability" of specific prejudice).
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essary that the impact of the prejudice on the minds of the members of
the court-martial be tested in respect to both the findings and sentence.
20
The United States Supreme Court in the Kotteakas case suggested
two possible limitations on the application of the "harmless error" rule.
They are:
(1) where the error involves a recognizable departure from a
constitutional precept, and
(2) where it constitutes a departure from an express command
of the legislature.
These limitations were readily adopted by the Court of Military Ap-
peals21 and it was deemed advisable by the Court to add a third:
(3) "We have in mind here a situation in which the error con-
sists not in a violation of constitutional or legislative pro-
visions, but involves instead an overt 'departure from some
'creative and indwelling principle'-some critical and basic
norm operative in the area under consideration.
'22
The last of these limitations is referred to by the Court as "general"
prejudice as distinguished from "specific" prejudice. 23
B. Specific Prejudice
(1) Instruction of law officers
An important segment of cases involving the "harmless error" rule
deals with the instructions of the law officer to a general court-martial.
The law officer is the judge24 in the military system and his duties in
this connection are contained in Article 51c of the Code:
"Before a vote is taken on the findings, the law officer of a
general court-martial and the president of a special court-martial
shall, in the presence of the accused and counsel, instruct the
court as to the elements of the offense and charge the court-
(1) that the accused must be presumed innocent until his guilt
is established by legal and competent evidence beyond
reasonable doubt;
(2) that in the case being considered, if there is a reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the doubt shall be re-
solved in favor of the accused and he shall be acquitted;
(3) that if there is a reasonable doubt as to the degree of guilt,
the finding must be in a lower degree as to which there is
no reasonable doubt; and
(4) that the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt is upon the Government."
o United States v. Welch, No. 196 (May 27, 1952).
2 United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952).
22 1Id. at 123.
"United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952); United States v.
Berry (No. 69) 2 CMR 141 (1952). See Judge Brosman's. concurring opinion
in United States v. Gordon (No. 258), 2 CMR 161 (1952).2 United States v. Clark (No. 190) 2 CMR 107 (1952).
[Vol. 31
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Paragraph 73b of the Manual goes further and requires these instruc-
tions be given even in cases where the plea is guilty.2 5 Therefore, it
is error for the law officer to fail to instruct the court-martial whether
the accused pleads guilty26 or not guilty.2 7 But if the accused pleaded
guilty, it constitutes a waiver and in such case a failure to instruct will
not constitute reversible error.28 If the law officer merely refers the
court-martial to provisions in the Manual, such -does not constitute an
adequate instruction on the elements of an offense.29 It is error for
the law officer to instruct the court-martial incorrectly.30
When and how the law officer shall instruct in the elements of lesser
included offenses presents difficult questions. He must determine if
there is some evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn
that the lesser included offense is in issue. If so, he must instruct in
the elements of all appropriate lesser included offenses.-3 If not, he
should refrain from doing so because, according to the Court,32 it
would be misleading to the court-martial.
In RhodeO.3 one of the charges 34 against the accused was the of-
fense of willfully disobeying a lawful command of a superior officer.
The specification reads as follows:
"In that [the accused] having received a lawful command from
1st Lt. John H. Stopyro, his superior officer, to stop talking
and sit down did . . . willfully, disobey the same." '35
The law officer instructed the members of the court-martial on this
specification in the following language:
"The court is advised that the elements of the offense are . . .
That the accused received a lawful command from a certain of-
-"United States v. Lucas (No. 7), 1 CMR 21 (1951); The Court stated:
"While we may be unable to ascertain any virtue in the additional requirement,
we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the language used."
"'United States v. Lucas (No. 7) 1 CMR 21 (1951); United States v.
Bishop (No. 37) 1 CMR 29 (1951) ; United States v. O'Brassill (No. 52) 1 CMR
27 (1951).
"United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74 (1951); United States v.
Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952).
" United States v. Lucas (No. 7) 1 CMR 21 (1951) ; United States v. Bishop
(No. 37) 1 CMR 29 (1951); United States v. O'Brassill (No. 52), 1 CMR 27
(1951).
' United States v. Gilbertson, No. 318 (July 22, 1952). (Judge Latimer dis-
sented).
"United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952); United States v.
Goddard, No. 331 (July 24, 1952).
"United States v. Clark (No. 190) 2 CMR 107 (1952); United States v.
Ollie C. Williams (No. 251) 2 CMR 137 (1952); United States v. Avery, No.
809 (July 7, 1952).
"United States v. Roman (No. 191) 2 CMR 150 (1952).
" (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952) ; the Court arrived at same result in United
States v. McRory, No. 433 (March 24, 1952).
" The Court also considered a finding that the accused was guilty of an
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ficer and that the accused failed to obey said command from his
superior officer."36
The court-martial rendered a verdict of guilty of wilfull disobedience-
an offense greater than failure to obey. The verdict reached carried no
limit as to the period of confinement where the offense, as here, occur-
red in the Far East Command; whereas the maximum sentence for
failure to obey was six months.8 7 The misinstruction of the law of-
ficer permitted the court-martial to find the accused guilty of wilfull
disobedience on a showing of mere failure to obey. Unquestionably,
here was a clear-cut case of specific prejudice. 8 The Court reversed
the board of review which had affirmed the finding and sentence.
In ClarkF9 the law officer instructed the court-martial in the elements
of the offense charged-i. e., voluntary manslaughter; and further he
mentioned the lesser included offenses, among them negligent homicide,
but failed to offer any instructions on lesser included offenses. The
accused was found guilty of negligent homicide. In reversing the board
of review which had affirmed the conviction, the Court found a "reason-
able possibility" that without any instructions on negligent homicide
the court-martial might have considered negligence as being something
different or less than an appropriate instruction would have required.
Chief Judge Quinn dissented. Assuming failure to instruct was error,
he failed to find the required prejudice.
In Banks4" the accused was convicted of an assault with intent to
murder. The law officer refused to instruct the court-martial on the
lesser included offense of an assault with intent to commit voluntary
manslaughter. The accused was the aggressor throughout the encount-
er, which had terminated when the accused shot at another soldier
three or four times without hitting him. The Court stated the test in
regard to the necessity of instructions on lesser offenses is whether the
the lesser offense constitutes, under the evidence, a "reasonable alter-
native" to the offense charged. To constitute an assault with intent
to commit voluntary manslaughter, the acts in question must have been
done under such circumstances that, had death ensued, the offense
would have been voluntary manslaughter. Here there was no basis
to conclude the assault was for any offense less than murder-hence
it was not error for the law officer to refuse such an instruction.
"Emphasis supplied.
"' Art. 92 carries maximum confinement of six months and a bad conduct
discharge. MANUAL p. 221.
"In United States v. Berry (No. 69) 2 CMR 141 (1952) the Court stated
that specific prejudice was found in the Rhoden case. United States v. Goddard,
No. 331 (July 24, 1952) (prejudicial error where charge on absence without
leave and the finding was desertion).
39 (No. 190) 2 CMR 107 (1952). Negligent homicide is now an offense under
the CoDE , Article 134 for all the services. United States v. Kirchner, No. 654
(July 24, 1952).
" No. 382 (July 24, 1952).
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In Ginn41 the Court adopted the same requirement for instructions
to the court-martial on self-defense as for lesser included offenses.
There must be some evidence from which a reasonable inference can be
drawn that an affirmative defense was in issue.
When the offense charged is an assault with a specific intent to
commit an aggravated offense, it is necessary that the offense itself be
properly defined. For example, where the alleged offense is an as-
sault with intent to murder, the court-martial must be informed of the
meaning of murder as well as of assault.
42
(2) Instructions of Law Officers in Desertion Cases
Three of the several and distinct ways in which the offense of
desertion might be committed are :43
(1) absence without leave with intent to desert the military
service,
44
(2) absence without leave with an intent to avoid hazardous
duty,4-5 and
(3) absence without leave with an intent to shirk important
service.
46
Although each is based on a different mental attitude, boards of re-
view47 have held that a specification which alleged the accused "de-
serted the service and remained absent in desertion until apprehended"
permitted a court-martial to return a verdict of guilty of any of the
"No. 263 (July 10, 1952).
" United States v. Ollie Williams, No. 251 (March 14, 1952); United States
v. Banks, No. 382 (July 24, 1952). United States v. Drew, No. 422 (July 23,
1952) (involuntary manslaughter).
"United States v. Hemp, No. 290 (April 8, 1952). See CODE, Art. 85 for
others.
" In United States v. Jenkins, No. 238 (April 21, 1952) the Court rejected
the argument that desertion with intent to remain away permanently was a lesser
included offense of desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty and stated that
it was a separate arm of the same crime.
"r"It is likely that this Court would take judicial notice that all duty in a
theater of operations, if not actually hazardous, would certainly invoke important
service." United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952).
" " . . . the very fact that he left while on order to report to a post outside
the continental United States brings into prominence an intent to shirk important
service. It is well established in military law that absence without leave with
knowledge of immediate overseas movement is sufficient from which a court may
find desertion predicated on the intent to shirk important service." United States
v. Hemp, No. 290 (April 8, 1952) adv. op. p. 9.
"Undoubtedly, service beyond the continental limits of the United States may,
under certain circumstances, be considered 'important service,' but we believe
that phrase as used in the Article of War and as explained in the Manual denotes
something more than the ordinary everyday service of every member of the armed
forces stationed overseas. If it does not, then absence without leave and desertion
outside the continental limits of the United States would be synonymous." United
States v. Boone, No. 320 (May 9, 1952) adv. op. pp. 4, 5.
7 United States v. Hemp, No. 290 (April 8, 1952) citing specifically CM
245568, United States v. Clancy, 29 BR 215.
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three types of desertion proved by the facts. The Court rejected48
this view, and stated that it was better practice to place the burden on
the prosecution to allege specifically the type of mental attitude to be
used as a base for a finding of guilt rather than to require the accused
to meet any of the three mental attitudes contained in a specification
alleging general intent. Therefore, a specification which alleges "the
accused deserted the service and remained absent in desertion until ap-
prehended" is not a general allegation. It will be construed to allege
only (1) supra, i.e., absence without leave with intent to desert the
military service.
In addition to requiring the prosecution to allege specifically the
type of intent it would undertake to prove, the Court decided it was
error for the law officer to instruct that the elements of proof consisted
of an intent other than the one alleged.4 9 The proper procedure was
to "tailor" the instruction to fit the intent charged.
The Court, after finding error, was still concerned with the addi-
tional question of whether error was materially prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the accused.50 To decide this question the Court must
analyze the facts of each case to 'determine if it was probable that
reasonable men might be led to render a finding on an element of intent
not framed by the specification. If so, the instruction constitutes error
which is materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
and therefore, reversible error. The manner in which the Court has
determined the question of prejudice in these cases may be understood
more clearly by dealing with two cases in which a contrary result was
reached.
In Hempr"1 the specification under which the accused was tried is
as follows:
"In that (accused) did, while enroute from Westover Air Force
Base, Massachusetts, to McAndrew Air Force Base, Newfound-
land, on or about 19 October 1950, desert the service of the
United States, and did remain absent in desertion until he was
apprehended at Springfield, Massachusetts, on or about 2 June
1951."
As previously indicated such a specification is regarded by the Court
as charging only an intent to 'desert the service with intent not to re-
"'Ibid. The Court also rejected the suggestion that an accused should be
required to file a request for a bill of particulars if more specific allegations
were desired. Among other things, the Court stated that a lack of time and the
fact that military counsel usually had other duties to perform, particularly in
combat areas made it unwise for the military courts to follow the civilian courts
in this practice.
"'United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952).
"CODE, Art. 59a.
" No. 290 (April 8, 1952).
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turn. The law officer, instructed the court-martial that the elements
of proof were as follows:
"Proof: (a) that the accused absented himself without leave
from his place of service, organization, or place of duty, as al-
leged; (b) that he intended, at the time of absenting himself, or
at some time during his absence, to remain away permanently
from such place or to avoid hazardous 'duty, or to shirk impor-
tant service, as alleged . ".. -52
The accused was found guilty by the court-martial of desertion. After
examining the facts, the Court found two possible intents were "inter-
woven inextricably" in the case.
"The evidence may preponderate in favor of an intent to aban-
don the service permanently, but the accused testified and denied
that he so intended. No one contends that the court was bound
to believe his testimony, and that it was therefore required to
find some other intent or return a finding of not guilty. But
the very fact that he left while on orders to report to a post out-
side the continental United States brings into prominence an in-
tent to shirk important service."
5
Here, according to the Court, the evidence was not "weighted over-
whelmingly" in favor of an intent not to return as alleged in the speci-
fication, and ffurther, the Court felt that the scales might tilt in favor
of intent to shirk important service. Consequently, the law officer in
his instruction interjected in the trial an intent not contained in the
specification. Under the circumstances the court-martial might have
concluded that proof of either intent was sufficient and could have con-
victed the accused of an offense beyond the fair confines of the plead-
ings. The result was an erroneous instruction which "may have affec-
ted the findings" and therefore, materially prejudiced the substantial
rights of the accused. The conviction" was reversed.
In Jenkins5 4 the specification on which accused was tried and con-
victed alleged:
"In that (accused) did, in the vicinity of Packtong-Ni Yongdu-
Ri Area Korea on or about 7 March 1951, desert the service of
the United States by absenting himself without leave from his
organization, with intent to avoid hazardous duty, to wit; serv-
ice with his unit in a combat area, and did remain absent in
desertion until he was apprehended at Pusan, Korea, on or about
19 March 1951."
The law officer committed the same error which had occurred in the
' In United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952) adv.
op. p. 3 the Court rejected the argument that use of the words "as alleged" would
preclude error. Emphasis supplied.
"'United States v. Hemp, No. 290 (April 8, 1952), adv. op. p. 9. Emphasis
supplied.
"No. 238 (April 21, 1952).
1952]
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Hemp case by instructing the court-martial in all three types of deser-
tion although only one type was alleged in the specification. The record
showed that the accused had been sent from his unit, which occupied
a defensive position, to assist a litter team in carrying a wounded sol-
dier to an aid station. The following morning he was discovered in
the rear area and ordered forward with a food carrying party. He
fled the first time the party was exposed to mortar and artillery fire.
The Court observed that the specification and the theory of both the
prosecution and defense were all directed toward one intent; i.e., to
avoid hazardous duty. Although the Court conceded that an inference
of an intent to remain away permanently might be drawn from the fact
that the accused was apprehended two hundred miles from his unit;
to draw such an inference would require the court-martial to overlook
the obvious intent involved in the case. The Court found the error
was not prejudicial and distinguished this case from the Hemp case in
the following language:
In the Hemp55 case "the pleadings, evidence, arguments and the
entire proceedings weighted almost equally on both issues of
intent. Reasonable minds might have determined that there was
substantial evidence on both sides of the scale, and might have
chosen either as a base for an inference of intent. Not so here.
This whole proceeding is weighted so overwhelmingly with evi-
dence indicating an intent to avoid hazardous duty that a reason-
able mind would have to ignore one side of the scale which was
heavily loaded to choose the other which held barely a scintilla.
Our understanding of human behavior leads us to believe that
when the scales are so obviously out of balance reasonable minds
would not be confused or misled as to which intent could be in-
ferred from the facts."5
In addition to the Hemp and Jenkins cases the Court has decided five 7
other desertion cases involving a similar question of prejudicial error.
Two58 were reversed and three59 were affirmed.
Offenses which occured prior to the effective date of the Code and
therefore charged as violations of the Articles of War, or the Articles
for the Government of the Navy, or the disciplinary laws of the Coast
Guard were triable after the effective date of the Code in accordance
"The Court was distinguishing both the Hemp and Williams cases from the
Jenkin case.
"o United States v. Jenkins (No. 238) (April 21, 1952), adv. op. p. 5.
" United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952); United
States v. Moynihan, No. 278 (April 21, 1952) ; United States v. Boone, No. 320
(May 9, 1952) ; United States v. Cooke, No. 307 (June 3, 1952); United States
v. Shepard, No. 343 (July 25, 1952).
5 "United States v. Russell Williams; United States v. Shepard, supra note57.
" United States v. Moynihan; United States v. Boone; United States v. Cooke,
supra note 57.
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with the procedure of the Code.60 Although the new procedure re-
quires the law officer to instruct the court-martial, the older Manuals
used in these cases do not contain appropriate provisions for this pur-
pose. Undoubtedly, many of these errors may be attributed to the
fact that law officers read instructions from the old Manual without
considering that such instructions were inadequate. The Manual for
Courts-Martial, 1951, has separate provisions describing desertion with
an intent not to return from the other types. According to the Court,
its use along with a careful analysis of the foregoing cases, should bring
about a considerable reduction of such errors.
In Goddard6 2 the Court made it clear that even though a court-
martial may infer an intent to desert from such prolonged absence, it
is prejudicial error for the law officer to instruct in a manner which
indicates that desertion would follow as a matter of law.
An experienced law officer will have difficulty in instructing a court-
martial in a manner which will meet with the approval of the Court.
This appears to be particularly true in respect to lesser included of-
fenses. The president of a special court-martial, usually untrained in
the law, is even less likely to fulfill the technical requirements involved
in instructing the court-martial.
(3) Specific Prejudice in Cases Other Than Those Involving
Instructions of Law Officers.
In Bound63 the accused was convicted by a special court-martial
in the Navy for the wrongful appropriation of an automobile. One
member of the court-martial, a lieutenant, as security officer on the
night of the occurrence of the offence, had conducted an informal in-
vestigation. Although it was conceded that the lieutenant did not
investigate the charges within the meaning of Article 32 of the Code,
he was, nevertheless, in the opinion of the Court an investigating of-
ficer within the meaning of Paragraph 64 of the Manual. As such he
was forbidden by Article 25d (2) of the Code to sit as a member of
this special court-martial. Error was committed when he was allowed
to continue sitting on the Court after his previous connection with the
case had been disclosed. The Court decided at the outset that the error
was not a recognizable departure from a constitutional concept or from
an express command of the legislature. It then examined the record for
specific prejudice. None was present in respect to the findings because
the accused pleaded guilty and the error was thereby waived. 64 But the
00United States v. Hemp No. 290 (April 8, 1952), adv. op. p. 2.
8 1 MANUAL, Par. 164a.
" No. 331 (July 24, 1952).
03 (No. 201) 2 CMR 130 (1952)."' Waiver discussed in section VII.
1952]
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Court did find a "probability" of specific prejudice in the sentence.
This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the lieutenant knew the
facts of the case whereas the court-martial did not. Because of the
plea of guilty, no evidence was introduced by the prosecution. 8 There-
fore, the lieutenant was in a position to influence the court-martial in
imposing a more severe sentence than it might have given otherwise.00
The board of review had ordered a rehearing and the Court of Military
Appeals affirmed.
Although it appears as an afterthought, the Court did not overlook
the possibility of "general" prejudice. 7 However, it decided to ex-
press no opinion on whether "general" prejudice was involved in this
case inasmuch as it bad found a "probability" of specific prejudice.
In Gordon8 two charges were considered initially: (1) an attempt
to burglarize the home of General Lee and (2) burglarizing the home
of another general. The accused confessed before trial. General Lee,
with knowledge of the confession, issued an order convening the general
court-martial which subsequently tried the accused. After the court-
martial had been appointed but before trial, the charge of an attempt
to burglarize the home of General Lee was dismissed because the pre-
trial investigation failed to reveal any substantial evidence to cor-
roborate the confession of the accused. The accused was convicted of
the remaining charge and the board of review affirmed. The Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force certified the following question to
the Court of Military Appeals:
"Under the circumstances disclosed in this record of trial, was
Brigadier General Lee disqualified to act as convening and re-
viewing authority in this case?"
The Court answered in the affirmative and stated that it was the
intent of Congress that a court-martial should not be appointed by one
who had a personal feeling or interest in the matter. Further, the test
was not the animus of the convening authority but whether he was so
closely connected with the offense that a reasonable person would con-
clude that he had a personal interest in the matter. Considering
General Lee's knowledge of the case at the time the court-martial was
"In the Navy conviction generally follows immediately after a plea of guilty.
The Army practice is otherwise and trial counsel usually introduces sufficient
evidence to make out a prima facie case. MANUAL, Par. 70a permits either prac-
tice. LEGAL AND LEGISLATIVE BASIS MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (1951), p. 92.
"Accused was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge and four months' con-
finement. The maximum he could have received by this special court-martial
was a bad conduct discharge and six months. The Court considered the sentence
"relatively severe" but conceded it would have not so appeared had the trial been
by a general court-martial.
"Perhaps explainable because the doctrine first appeared on the same day
this case was decided. United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952).
68 (No. 258) 2 CMR 161 (1952).
[Vol. 31
THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEAL
appointed, the Court believed the reasonable "probabilities" were that
the impartiality demanded by Congress was not present. Moreover,
the Court felt notwithstanding the fact that General Lee had reduced
the sentence as reviewing authority, he might have reduced it more
if he had been free from any connection with the controversy. Ac-
cordingly, it was the opinion of the Court that the substantial rights
of the accused were materially prejudiced.
Judge Brosman concurred in the result and stated, "I prefer to
bottom my concurrence on the concept of general prejudice . ... "
In Keith69 the accused was found guilty of two offenses: (1) mis-
behavior before the enemy and (2) desertion. He was sentenced to
dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures and confinement at hard labor
for five years. The law officer failed to instruct the court-martial in
the elements of the offense of misbehavior before the enemy. This
was prejudicial error and under the authority of the Clay69- case the
finding of guilty of this offense was invalid. However, the valid con-
viction of desertion was sufficient to support the entire sentence. The
Court was urged to adopt the general rule as applied in federal, courts.
The rule as stated by the Court is as follows:
"By its terms, if an accused is convicted under an indictment
containing several counts-regardless of the character of the
verdict-and a general sentence is imposed, which is either man-
datory or appropriate in fact and law for a valid conviction under
a single count, neither the verdict nor the sentence will be re-
versed for error in other counts."
The Court conceded that as to the sentence there could be situations
in which there would be no prejudicial error in applying this rule.
But the Court stated that to leave the findings undisturbed "may operate
to prejudice materially-although collaterally-the rights of an accused
military person quite apart from its possible effect on sentence quan-
tum... " For instance, an invalid finding, uncorrected in the record,
might cause an accused to be sent to a civilian prison instead of being
retained in military control-the latter offering more generous pro-
visions for good conduct time and opportunities for parole. Moreover,
it could affect the rights of the accused before a clemency board, or
perhaps cause a loss of certain rights applicable to convicted deserters,
or in a subsequent trial it could possibly be counted against the accused
as a prior conviction. For these reasons the Court rejected the rule
and reversed the finding of guilty of misbehavior before the enemy.
Inasmuch as the Court does not have the authority to change a sentence,
the case was remanded for reference to the board of review for the
D No. 226 (July 3, 1952).
"aD See note 83 infra.
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purpose of giving that forum an opportunity to determine the adequacy
of the sentence for the offense of desertion.
Prejudicial error was found where the law member (officer) denied
a motion for a continuance 0 made by the defense after it had been sur-
prised by a ruling of the law member which excluded certain testimony.
C. Error not prejudicial
In Lee"1 the Court decided it was not prejudicial for an accuser sub-
sequently to act as trial counsel in the same case. To constitute preju-
dicial error it is necessary to show that the trial counsel was in fact
"biased, prejudiced, or hostile."
Two cases certified to the Court by the Judge Advocate General
of the Navy involved the qualifications of counsel in a special court-
martial. In HutchinsonW2 a non-commissioned warrant officer was the
regularly appointed assistant defense counsel. He did not serve in
the case. The Court assuming error found no "reasonable possibility"
of prejudice and reversed the board of review which had set aside the
findings and sentence. In Goodson73 the trial counsel was a non-com-
missioned warrant officer. The Court found error in appointing a
person other than an officer as trial counsel but held that inasmuch as
it was only a technical non-compliance with the Code, and since the
accused had pleaded guilty, his rights were not substantially prejudiced.
Again the decision of the board of review, which had set aside the
findings and sentence, was reversed.
In Doyle74 the prosecution had failed to show a confession was
voluntary. There was no evidence it was involuntary and there was
other convincing proof of guilt. Therefore, the Court concluded the
error did not substantially prejudice the rights of the accused and af-
firmed the finding of the board of review.
In Bartholomew"5 the trial counsel was legally trained and the de-
fense counsel was a high school graduate. Neither was a qualified
lawyer. Article of War 11, applicable in this case, did not require
counsel to be qualified lawyers and contained no provision for equality
of training when counsel were non-lawyers. The Court found a tech-
nical compliance with the Article of War in this case but felt it was
inconsistent with its spirit. However, the excellent manner in which
defense counsel conducted the defense resulted in the Court finding
"0United States v. Plummer, No. 235 (May 7, 1952) (Judge Latimer dis-
sented).
' (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952).
"'No. 425 (April 9, 1952).
"' No. 424 (April 14, 1952).
No. 265 (May 20, 1952). A violation of Par. 174 Naval Courts and Boards
and now a violation of MANUAL Par. 140a. See section V.
"' No. 166 (April 16, 1952).
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no specific prejudice. Because of a literal adherence to the standard
set by Congress in Article of War 11, "as well as readily discernible
reasons of a practical character", the Court did not regard this case as
a proper one in which to apply the concept of "general" prejudice. Al-
though this situation will no longer arise in a general court-martial" it
may occur in a special court-martial. 77 Whether the substantial rights
of the accused were materially prejudiced may !depend on the manner
in which the defense counsel performed his duties.
In Gilgallon78 it was held to be only a minor irregularity that the
court-martial announced the sentence in terms of two-thirds forfeiture
of pay for two months instead of a specific number of dollars and cents
as required by the Manual.
D. Military Due Process
On November 27, 1952, the Court announced it would regard cer-
tain errors as constituting a violation of what the Court termed "mili-
tary due process. '79 "Military due process" is analogous to "due
process" in the civilian courts except that it is based on Acts of Con-
gress; i.e., the Code rather than the Constitution of the United States.
The Court defined due process in the following language:
"Generally speaking, due process means a course of legal pro-
ceedings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforce-
ment and protection of private rights."8 0
There are certain standards in the military system which have been
"specifically set" by Congress and which the Court has stated must
be observed in the trials of military offenses. To illustrate, the Court
listed some, but not necessarily all, of the rights in the Code which
parallel those accorded to defendants in civilian courts:
"To be informed of the charges against him; to be confronted
by witnesses testifying against him; to cross-examine witnesses
for the Government; to challenge members of the court for cause
or peremptorily; to have a specified number of members compose
general and special courts-martial; to be represented by coun-
sel; not to be compelled to incriminate himself; to have invol-
untary confessions excluded from consideration; to have the
7' See MANUAL, Par. 6b. Counsel must be qualified lawyers.
77 "Any officer not disqualified by reason of prior participation in the same case
may be appointed trial counsel or defense counsel of a special court-martial. But
if the trial counsel is qualified to act as counsel before a general court-martial, the
defense counsel must be similarly qualified ... N." MA UAL, Par. 6c.
"' (No. 286) 2 CMR 170 (1952).
"United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74 (1951). The germ of this idea
appears in the MANUAL, Par. 87c in connection with the review of the convening
authority. This section was quoted by the Court in United States v. Lucas (No. 7)
1 CMR 21 (1951). For an excellent discussion of this subject see Wurfel, Mili-
tary DTe Process, 6 VAND. L. REv. (December, 1952).
" United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74, 77 (1951).
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court instructed on the elements of the offense, the presumption
of innocence, and the burden of proof; to be found guilty of an
offense only when a designated number of members concur in a
finding to that effect; to be sentenced only when a certain number
of members vote in the affirmative; and to have an appellate re-
view."81
The Court pointed out the seriousness of such error in the following
manner:
" ... if the denial of these benefits to a defendant is of suf-
ficient importance to justify a civilian court in holding that it de-
nied him due process, it should be apparent to a casual reader
that denial of a similar right granted by Congress to an accused
in the military service constitutes a violation of military dlue
process."8 2
For reasons not altogether apparent, the Court decided it would not
deal with this type of error in terms of jurisdiction. Instead, it would
use its powers as an appellate court to reverse for errors of law which
materially prejudice the substantial rights of the accused.
Two "military due process" cases were decided by the Court dur-
ing the first year.
In Clays3 the accused pleaded not guilty to a charge of disorder.
The president of the special court-martial failed to charge the court
on the elements of the offense, the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof as required by the Code8 4 and the Manual. 85 After
the accused was found guilty, but before sentence, the defense counsel
complained that no instructions had been given. The court-martial
admitted procedural error had occurred but took no action except to
attach an explanation to the record. The board of review found the
failure to instruct was not prejudicial because of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding of guilty. The Court decided it was in-
appropriate to apply the test of specific prejudice and used the follow-
ing language:
"Assuming without deciding that the evidence compels such a
finding, we are, nevertheless, required to hold the error material-
ly prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused, for the reason
that we can not say one of the historic cornerstones of our system
of civil jurisprudence is merely a formality of military procedure.
If Congress specifically grants what it considers to be a sub-
stantial right, we cannot deny the authoritative requirement by
refusing to recognize it."8 6
"' Id. at 77, 78. 8 Id. at 79.
83 (No. 49) 1 CMR 74 (1951); Notes, 20 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 490 (1952);
27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 163 (1952) ; 50 MicH. L. REv. 1084, 1089 (1952). See also for
failure to instruct: United States v. Keith, No. 226 (July 3, 1952) ; United States
v. Shepard, No. 343 (July 25, 1952) (Charge III only).
" CoDE, Art. 51c. "MANUAL, Par. 73b.
8" United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74, 81 (1951). The Court reached
the same result in United States v. James, No. 551 (May 8, 1952).
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It thus appears that material prejudice flows automatically from the
mere commission of those errors denominated violations of "due proc-
ess." This conclusion is further supported in Welch.87 After the
Court found that the accused had been denied the right against self-
incrimination in an official pre-trial investigation, it stated:
"It follows automatically that the testimony given at this investi-
gation should not have been received in evidence at the trial.
Article of War 24 ...and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ... so command. Further, it matters not that
there may be other evidence of guilt. The right here violated
flows through Congressional enactment from the Constitution of
the United States. Military due process requires that courts-
martial be conducted not in violation of these constitutional safe-
guards which Congress has seen fit to accord members of the
Armed Forces."88
Both opinions indicate that "military due process" cases do not require
a test of specific prejudice.8 9 Instead, such error per se constitutes
specific prejudice and in effect is an exception to the "harmless error"
rule. Errors which constitute a violation of "military due process"
appear to be a departure from an express command of Congress and
therefore a "recognizable departure from a constitutional precept."
The Court has announced it would use federal court cases9 ° as a
source from which it could test the prejudicial effect of denying an
accused the rights set out in the pattern of "military due process". The
advantage in maintaining similar terminology may explain, at least in
part, why the Court adopted the term "military due process".
There may be certain advantages in disassociating lack of due proc-
ess from jurisdictional error. Should the Court develop a body of
jurisdictional errors-as distinguished from the rare situation in which
the court-martial had no jurisdiction over the person or the offense
charged-it might thereby invite increased review of court-martial pro-
ceedings by federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings. The United
States Supreme Court used the following language in Hiatt v. Brown :91
"The Court of Appeals also concluded that certain errors com-
mitted by the military tribunal and reviewing authorities had
deprived respondent of due process. We think the court was
in error in extending its review, for the purpose of determining
compliance with the due process clause, to such matters as the
propositions of law set forth in the staff judge advocate's report,
" No. 196 (May 27, 1952).
"8 Id. at 7.
" Judge Latimer's concurring opinion in Welch indicates he would apply
specific prejudice. Considering he wrote the opinion in the Clay case he must
mean that the error per se constitutes specific prejudice.
" United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74 (1951-)."1 Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U. S. 103, 110-111 (1949).
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the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain respondent's convic-
tion, the adequacy of pretrial investigation, and the competence
of the law member and the defense counsel .... It is well settled
that, by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise no supervisory
or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial
* . . The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction."
However, it does not follow that more serious errors committed during
trial will be considered non-jurisdictional. Always in the background
is the warning of Mr. justice Douglas in Wheichel v. McDonald :2
"We put to one side the due process issue which respondent
presses, for we think it plain from the law governing court-
martial procedure that there must be afforded a defendant at
some point of time an opportunity to tender the issue of insanity.
It is only a denial of that opportunity which goes to the question
of jurisdiction."
Another possible reason why it would be unwise to develop a body of
jurisdictional errors is that the Court of Military Appeals does not
have necessarily the last word on what constitutes jurisdiction. If a
question of jurisdiction is determined against an accused, it is possible
such question may come before the Supreme Court of the United States
in a review of a habeas corpus proceeding. In such event the voice
of finality on a question of jurisdiction is that of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
E. General Prejudice
In Lee, 31 the Court developed by dictum a third limitation on the
"harmless error" rule which may be applied where the error "involves
an overt departure from some 'creative and indwelling principle'-some
critical and basic norm operative in the area under consideration." In
this area the doctrine of "general" prejudice will be applied as distin-
guished from the Court's concept of specific prejudice.
By way of illustration the Court gives an example of what it has
in mind in creating this form of "general" prejudice:
"Such a compelling criterion we find within the sphere of this
Court's effort in the sound content of opposition to command
control of the military judicial process to be derived with as-
surance from all four corners of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. ' 9 4
Looking at the facts of the case the Court found that this criterion was
not violated when the accuser served as trial counsel in the case. Neither
"Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U. S. 122, 124 (1950). See Note, 15 A.L.R.
2d 387 (1952).
(No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952).
"Id. at 123. On command control see "Report of the Special Committee
on Military Justice," ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERIcAx BAR ASSOCIATION, Vol.
76, p. 378 (1951).
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did it make any difference that the accuser as such made a brief pre-
liminary inquiry into the facts of the case. The Court found no sug-
gestion whatever of specific prejudice-that is "of prejudice operating
against the accused in this particular case." 95  The decision of the
board of review, which had set aside the findings and sentence on the
ground that the error was jurisdictional, 8 was reversed.
In Berry,97 decided a few days after the Lee case, the Court applied
the concept of "general" prejudice which it had announced in the Lee
case. During a trial by a general court-martial the president of the
court-martial for reasons unexplained took over the duties of the law
member (officer) and ruled on motions, admissibility of a confession
and advised the accused of his rights. The Court held this was error
and ruled that it would not examine the record for specific prejudice
but instead it would apply the doctrine of "general" prejudice. The
reasons are stated in the following language:
"If the president of a general court-martial-freely selected as
he is by the convening authority, possibly more concerned with
military discipline than with law administration, and almost cer-
tainly less well informed within the latter sphere under ordinary
circumstances-is able to usurp the judgelike functions of the
law member, then, we are much afraid, at least one barrier inter-
posed by Congress in the path of what has been popularly char-
acterized as 'command influence' has been weakened, if not re-
moved." 8
In this case the Court concluded that the record disclosed "an inherently
and generally prejudicial disregard for an important segment of the
procedures deemed necessary by Congress in the establishment of a
scheme of military law administration more nearly in accord with the
American system of criminal justice". The action of the board of re-
view in approving the sentence of the court-martial was reversed.
As in the Lee case, Judge Latimer concurred only in the result. He
stated that he was not ready to agree on the concept of "general" prej-
udice which he considered "unnecessary in this setting" and which
was contrary to the clear mandate of Congress. But he found specific
prejudice resulted from the error.0 9
"United States v. Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952). "4Ibid.
'7 (No. 69) 2 CMR 141 (1952). United States v. Jones, No. 79 (April 14,
1952) adv. op. p. 2 (court-martial disregarded erroneous ruling of law member).
"United States v. Berry (No. 69) 2 CMR 141 (1952).
"Judge Latimer stated: "I believe that when Congress authorized preliminary
rulings by a legally trained person and that right is refused there is involved a
prejudicial denial of a right of substance. It is more than a belief that some over-
arching principle of general prejudice permeates the atmosphere of the court room.
It is the refusal to grant to the accused a fundamental right guaranteed to him
by the Articles of War. If we are permitted to reason by analogy with the
civilian practice this, to me, smacks of a judge allowing the foreman of a jury
to decide questions of law and admissibility of confessions." Id. at 149.
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The foregoing cases indicate certain departures from a require-
ment of specific prejudice. The concept of "military due process"
appears to carry with it the idea of prejudice per se. Once the Court
discovers an error which comes within the scope of this label it will
look no further for reversible error. Inasmuch as the Court has out-
lined in some -detail what is meant by "military due process," the con-
vening authority and boards of review should not be unduly handi-
capped in anticipating whether a case comes within this concept and
accordingly should be able to take appropriate action in their review.
"General" prejudice is a concept more difficult to define than
"military due process." Although we are told that command con-
trol comes within its sphere, there will be difficulty in anticipating
what the Court considers command control. For instance, if the presi-
lent of the court-martial usurps the functions of the law officer, there
is, according to the Court, command control irrespective of the fair-
ness of the rulings of the president; but if the convening authority was
so closely connected with the case that a reasonable person would con-
clude that he had a personal interest in the case, the Court looks for
one of its species of specific prejudice instead of finding "general" prej-
udice. It seems unlikely that many cases will be decided under general
prejudice doctrine. Its proper area of application will continue to
be one of speculation and conjecture.
Since only a limited number of cases will be subject to the concepts
of "military due process" and "general prejudice," the great majority
will be tested in terms of specific prejudice. If specific prejudice really
meant "prejudice operating against the accused" and that only in a
particular case, a reasonable guidepost for anticipating the attitude of
the Court on this question would be available. Unfortunately, this is
not necessarily true. Reversible error has been found where there was
"probability," and a "reasonable possibility" that the substantial rights
of the accused were materially prejudiced. If an officer on security
watch makes an informal investigation and later sits as a member of
the court-martial, there is "probability" of prejudice and reversible
error; but if the trial counsel made a preliminary investigation and
also served as accuser, the error is not a reversible one unless something
more is shown in the way of bias or prejudice on the part of the trial
counsel. This third departure from a requirement of actual prejudice
is even more nebulous than "military due process" or "general" prej-
udice. At least we are given some notion of what the Court will
consider "military due process" and "general" prejudice; but whether
we may- expect specific prejudice to be interpreted in terms of actual,
a "probability" or a "reasonable possibility" of prejudice is completely
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left to speculation inasmuch as the Court has not and cannot provide
any criterion.
It is apparent that the Court considers error in the light of two
considerations: (1) harm to the particular accused; (2) harm to the
system of military justice without regard to the harm to a particular
accused. Conceding that error should be tested in terms of protecting
the accused and the system, a simple and adequate approach would
have been to require actual prejudice with a single class of exceptions,
i.e., all errors which harm the system. Instead, the Court has developed
at least three types of exceptions to a requirement of actual prejudice:
(1) "probability" or "reasonable possibility" of specific prejudice; (2)
"military due process" (may or may not involve actual prejudice) ; and
(3) "general prejudice."
III. JURISDICTION
The Court of Military Appeals, as other appellate tribunals, deter-
mines if the trial court was legally constituted throughout the trial and
had jurisdiction over the offense and the person tried.
Jurisdictional questions relating to problems which arose in con-
nection with the transition from the old procedure to the new were
presented to the Court in several cases. 10 Inasmuch as these ques-
tions are rapidly becoming academic they will be omitted in this dis-
cussion.
In Market'0 ' the Court had little difficulty in deciding that the
accused, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army as super-
intendent of a tire plant in Japan and engaged in work for the armed
forces of the United States, was subject to courts-martial jurisdiction
inasmuch as he was "accompanying or serving with the Army" during
time of war.
In Ernerson °0 2 the charges were referred to a special court-martial
for trial but the trial was conducted by a different special court-martial.
The appointing order of this latter court-martial did not contain author-
ization for the trial of unarraigned cases already ordered to be tried
before a previously appointed court. The board of review decided that
this lack of a specific referral to the new court-martial for trial deprived
it of jurisdiction. The Court reversed the board of review because
Paragraph 33j of the Manual, which provides that "charges are ordi-
narily referred to a court-martial for trial by means of the endorse-
ment on page 3 of the charge sheet," is not mandatory. And a failure
..0 United States v. Merritt (No. 53) 1 CMR 56 (1951); United States v.
Sonnenschein (No. 8) 1 CMR 64 (1951) ; United States v. McSorley (Nos. 1 and
2) 1 CMR 84 (1951); United States v. Martin (No. 51) 1 CMR 82 (1951);
United States v. Sherwood (No. 3) 1 CMR 86 (1951).
101 No. 281 (May 19, 1952).
10 (No. 77) 1 CMR 43 (1951).
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to follow the procedure set out in the Manual for "customary usage" did
not constitute a defect of sufficient import to deprive the court-martial
of jurisdiction.
In only one case in which the offense occurred since the effective
date of the Code has the Court decided the court-martial was un-
authorized to try the accused. In La Grange10 3 the commanding officer
of a ship, a captain in rank, was the accuser. He disqualified himself
as convening authority and forwarded the papers to his superior officer
who in turn directed an officer, commander in rank, to exercise juris-
diction and to appoint a special court-martial. The question before
the Court was whether an officer junior to the accuser and one not
in the normal chain of command had authority to appoint the court-
martial. Article 23b of the Code in such circumstances provides that
the court-martial shall be convened by a "superior"' 0 4 competent author-
ity; whereas the Manual 05 requires "another" competent authority.
The Court resolved the apparent conflict in the terms of the Code and
Manual by concluding that the appointing authority must be "superior."
Since the commander was junior to the captain there was a violation
of the statutory conditions relating to the constitution of the court-
martial and therefore, the court-martial was not authorized to try the
accused. To hold otherwise, according to the Court, would open the
door for command control through a subordinate; a situation which
Congress intended to avoid by employing the word "superior" in the
Code.
In Hutchinson' 6 the following question was certified to the Court:
"Was the special court-martial without jurisdiction and the pro-
ceedings therefore invalid, because the appointed assistant de-
fense counsel, who did not act in the case, was not an officer with-
in the meaning of Article 1 (5), Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice ?"
The Court found no express requirement in the Code that an accused
be provided with assistant defense counsel or that an assistant defense
counsel be an officer-the latter, if true, would have to be inferred from
the Manual provision. Since the Court failed to find a violation of a
mandatory requirement of the Code, there was no jurisdictional defect.
The same question involving qualifications of counsel soon arose
again in a slightly different manner. In Goodso ,10 7 the question certi-
fied was as follows:
.0. No. 313. (April 24, 1952).
10" CoDE, Art. 1 (6). "Superior officer shall be construed to refer to an of-
ficer superior in rank or command."
.0. Par. 5a (3) (made applicable to special courts-martial by Par. 5b (2)).
..8 No. 425 (April 9, 1952).
"07 No. 424 (April 14, 1952).
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"Was the special court-martial without jurisdiction, and the
proceedings therefore invalid, because the appointed trial coun-
sel who acted in this case was not an officer within the meaning
of Article 1 (4), Uniform Code of Military Justice?"
This time the Court faced the issue squarely and decided it was im-
plicit in the Code, as expressed in the Manual, that appointed counsel
of inferior courts-martial must be an officer in the sense of Article 1
(5) of the Code. Here was a violation of the Code! But any notion
that every violation of a mandatory requirement of the Code consti-
tutes jurisdictional error was promptly dispelled. Only some viola-
tions would constitute jurisdictional error. This was not one. It was
not a provision which may be regarded as an "indispensable prerequi-
site" to concepts of military justice and a fair trial. It was reasonable
to anticipate that the Court would reach this conclusion inasmuch as
in May 08 the Court ha'd, in effect, held that a failure to have charges
sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths in violation of
Article 30 of the Code did not constitute jurisdictional error.
The Court has also noted that Paragraph 61f of the Manual makes
the equal qualification of counsel a jurisdictional requirement, insofar
as membership in the Judge Advocate General's Corps or in the bar
of a federal court or the highest court of a state is concerned. The
Court did not pass judgment on this point but did observe that the
Manual provision was based on the "mandatory" provisions of Article
27 of the Code.10 9
The Court stated that it was neither "necessary nor desirable"
110
to set out explicitly those provisions which may be jurisdictional and
those which are not. A clearer conception of what constitutes juris-
dictional error apparently will come only through the slow process of
judicial exclusion and inclusion. This process may be further retarded
by the appearance of the concept of "military -due process" in military
jurisprudence. Some errors which constitute a violation of "military
due process" might otherwise have been treated as jurisdictional errors.
But the necessity for doing this has been avoided since the Court, as
heretofore stated, deals with "military due process" cases in terms of
prejudicial error. The Court has also announced it has no intention
of classifying these errors as jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional.
'os (No. 241) 2 CMR 80 (1952).
... United States v. Hutchinson, No. 425 (April 9, 1952). In United States v.
Bartholomew, No. 166 (April 16, 1952) the Court stated: "A clear violation of
the express terms of Article of War 11 would certainly raise serious questions
of military due process, if not of jurisdiction."
A question involving jurisdiction was certified to the Court in United States v.
Lee (No. 200) 2 CMR 118 (1952). The Court stated that the court-martial
had jurisdiction. The opinion otherwise dealt with questions of prejudicial error.
11 United States v. Goodson, No. 424 (April 14, 1952).
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IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
In McCrary,"' the first written opinion of the Court, Judge Lati-
mer, writing for the majority, set forth "a few well known principles
of law" which would govern the scope of review:
(1) The Court, as is usual with appellate tribunals, is limited
to correction of errors of law.
(2) If there is any substantial evidence in the record to support
a conviction the Court, in the absence of other error, will not
set aside the verdict or conversely, the Court will set aside
a conviction where there is no substantial evidence to sus-
tain the finding.
(3) The principle of law requiring that the evidence must estab-
lish beyond a reasonable -doubt that the defendant is guilty
of the crime charged and the rule which states that the
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of in-
nocence are applicable to the trial forums and are not to
be applied by the Court of Military Appeals.
Judge Brosman in a concurring opinion dealt primarily with the
facts in the case and did not express his views on the principles govern-
ing review stated by Judge Latimer.
Chief Judge Quinn dissented. Although in agreement that the
Court was limited to the correction of errors of law, he took issue with
the other principles announced by Judge Latimer. His conception of
the rule to be applied regarding circumstantial evidence was:
" * * . there must be substantial evidence consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
This rule has been laid down even more strongly to the effect
that the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis but
that of guilt.""1
2
Unlike Judge Latimer, he did not regard this test in either of its ver-
sions as being confined to the trial forums but rather as an appropriate
test to be applied by the Court of Military Appeals.
The issue in the McCrary case was whether the court-martial was
justified in finding an intent to desert. Judges Latimer and Brosman
concluded that the finding should be affirmed on the basis of the follow-
ing facts which they considered were in evidence before the court-
martial:
(1) The accused who was stationed at Camp Stoneman, Cali-
fornia
(2) The station of the accused was in use as a staging area
(3) The station of the accused was approximately 45 miles from
the San Francisco Port of Embarkation
... (No. 4) 1 CMR 1 (1951).
'121d. at 12.
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(4) The accused who was a member of an overseas replace-
ment unit
(5) A sixty day absence without leave
(6) Termination of this absence at a point approximately 2,000
miles from the station of the accused
(7) A state of armed conflict existed in Korea involving United
States Forces.
Judge Latimer was of the opinion there was substantial evidence to
sustain the findings. Judge Brosman concluded that he could not say
that this finding is based on no substantial evidence. Other than this
we have no clue in the opinion as to whether Judge Brosman applied
the technique later explained by him in the O'Neal case. Chief Judge
Quinn's dissent sheds no light on how he would apply the "reasonable
hypothesis" rule which he favored inasmuch as he disagreed with the
majority on the facts which he considered were in the record. He
concluded there was "no legal competent evidence to indicate that
the accused intended permanently to abandon the military service."
It soon became apparent that the McCrary case raised but did not
settle the issue of the test to be applied by the Court in determining
whether circumstantial evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a conviction. Of the three judges only Judge Brosman had
yet expressly to discuss his views. For this reason he was in a position
to take the leadership in establishing the path for the Court to follow.
This he undertook to do in writing the majority opinion in O'Neal"'
-an opinion which at present is the leading case of the Court on the
subject. Judge Brosman did not criticize the views of either of his
colleagues. Instead, he took the position that he was merely explain-
ing in more detail the principles set forth by Judge Latimer in the Mc-
Crary case. He has adhered to this position in subsequent cases'1 4 not-
withstanding the fact that his interpretation of the scope of review pro-
voked a vigorous dissent by Judge Latimer in the O'Neal case and has at
least, in part, caused Judge Latimer to dissent in one" 5 other case and
concur only in the result in two" 6 others.
Judge Brosman approached the problem in the O'Neal case as
follows:
"Among other principles of law relevant to the problem before
us is that providing in substance that the evidence in a criminal
case must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty of the offense charged. To this must be added, of
"- (No. 25) 2 CMR 44 (1952).
"x' United States v. Jacobs (No. 152) 2 CMR 115 (1952) ; United States v.
Jarvis, No. 94 (May 6, 1952).
5 United States v. Shull (No. 45) 2 CMR 83 (1952).
""'United States v. Peterson, No. 199 (April -17, 1952); United States v.
Ferretti, No. 213 (April 18, 1952).
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course, the related proposition, often clothed in varying verbiage,
to the effect that the evidence in such a case must exclude every
reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt. All of these considera-
tions were recognized by us in United States v. McCrary, supra,
together with the observation that the two last mentioned rules
exist primarily for the guidance of trial forums. However, we
should not have said there, we did not intend to say there, nor
did we say there, that their administration by such agencies is
above and beyond the supervision of an appropriate appellate
tribunal-by this Court, in fact, although limited to 'action only
with respect to matters of law.' To hold the converse would ef-
fectively deprive appellate courts, including this one, of any sort
of effective control over subordinate elements of the judicial
scheme in an important area of law administration.'
1 '1
Having established the authority of the Court to share with trial forums
the technique of examining the evidence to determine if it is consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis of innocence, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt, Judge Brosman was still con-
fronted with the question as to whose judgment was to be applied in
making this determination. His answer was "our judgment, as such,
is not the standard for application, but rather our conception of the
judgment of reasonable men." Judge Latimer made it clear that he
would not test the sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether he
might conclude there was some hypothesis upon which the accused
might have been found innocent. Instead he continued to adhere to
his view as stated in the McCrary case.
"If there is some substantial evidence in the record which per-
mits the court-martial to conclude the accused is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt then we are not permitted to reverse because
one might or can draw a different conclusion."118
In the O'Neal case the accused was found guilty of making a false
writing in furtherance of a claim against the United States. The facts
were complicated but the issue was simple. Did the accused make the
entry which resulted in his receiving money for separate rations to which
he was not entitled? The majority, Judges Brosman and Quinn, ad-
mitted the evidence showed the accused had opportunity and motive for
making the false writing. There was also a possible inference of guilt
arising from the "quite loose similarity" between the method of adding
the name of the accused to a document admittedly made by him and the
manner in which the name of the accused was added to the document
in question but denied by the accused. Beyond this, however, there
""7 United States v. O'Neal (No. 25) 2 CMR 44 (1952).
"Id. at 58.
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was, according to the new majority, little to support the findings save
"suspicion, conjecture and speculation." It was concluded further that
opportunity was open to others to commit the offense and there was
possibly a motive at least for one other. The conviction was reversed
because the Court's conception of the judgment of reasonable men was
that such men would find a reasonable inference other than that of
guilt could be drawn from the evidence.
Judge Latimer, dissenting, found the evidence sufficient to sustain
the conviction. Although he objected to the majority seeking out some
hypothesis upon which the accused might be found innocent, he made
it clear that his dissent was not based solely on his differing with the
theory of review. In his opinion "the facts and cricumstances do ex-
clude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."
All members of the court are in agreement that trial forums should
be guided by the rules of reasonable doubt and that the evidence must
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. If the evidence does
not meet this test, the trial judge has a duty to set the conviction aside.
The crux of the disagreement between the majority and Judge Latimer
is the extent to which the Court should supervise the application of
these rules by a court-martial. The majority clearly favor reversing a
finding if the Court believes that reasonable men would be in accord
in holding that a rational hypothesis other than guilt may be drawn
from the evidence.
Adoption of this technique by the majority created a fear in the
mind of Judge Latimer that it permitted the Court to "invade the
province of the court-martial and weigh the evidence to arrive at a
result.""19 It would, according to Judge Latimer, make the Court a
fact-finding body-a function specifically denied by Congress. He
summarized his arguments on this point as follows:
".... I contend the Court's opinion [O'Neal] concedes that Con-
gress, by express words, limited this Court to questions of law,
but then escapes the effect of the limitation by adopting an arti-
ficial standard of proof which permits a review of the evidence,
not for the purpose of determining whether there is some sub-
stantial evidence to permit reasonable men to return a finding
of guilty, but for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient to fill a mold which is tailored to meet this Court's
specifications.'
120
Judges Brosman and Quinn do not believe that to "supervise" the
inferences of a court-martial violates the "clear legislative directive away
from the fact finding power." The necessity of. supervision is implied
by Judge Brosman in the O'Neal case in which he wrote of the rela-
"'Id. at 55. '2Id. at 57.
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tionship between the "unhealthy ascendency that the jury has obtained
over the trial judges" and the increasing power of appellate courts to
supervise the findings of juries. He pointed out that in this develop-
ment many courts have applied the techniques favored by the majority
of the Court of Military Appeals.
1 21
To undertake to define the differences between the majority and
Judge Latimer by stating they preferred the "reasonable hypothesis"
rule and he favored the "substantial evidence" rule would indulge in
an over-simplification which the Court itself has avoided. Judge Bros-
man admitted the approach he favored is "occasionally" called the
reasonable hypothesis rule but he does not know whether this approach
is a new rule in competition with that demanding substantial evidence,
or whether it is merely a specific application of the substantial evidence
rule.
In Shull' a court-martial found the accused guilty of absence
without leave with intent to shirk important service, to wit, shipment to
the Far East Command. Accused was stationed at Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, and had volunteered for overseas duty. He was informed
that he would be transferred to the replacement pool at that station.
His request for a three -day pass to go home and deal with a "family
difficulty" was granted with a warning of the seriousness involved
if he should overstay his pass. Approximately two weeks after the
expiration of the pass he was apprehended in his home town. During
this two weeks period of absence, orders had been issued transferring
him to the replacement pool and a contingent of enlisted men had de-
parted from the pool to Camp Stoneman, California. Judges Brosman
and Quinn agreed that the evidence before the court-martial did not
permit a determination of an intent on the part of the accused to shirk
important service in the Far Eastern Command beyond a reasonable
doubt and within the fair operation of reasonable minds. They fur-
ther concluded that beyond the transfer order to the pool "there is
little to support the findings save suspicion, conjecture, and specula-
tion."
Judge Latimer, again dissenting, found the evidence sufficient to
permit the court to find that accused knew "or should have known" that
any absence over and beyond the leave period probably would result
"1 Art. 51b of the CODE provides that a motion for a finding of not guilty
shall be treated as an interlocutory question. But if any member of the court-
martial objects to the ruling of the law officer (president of a special court-
martial) the court-martial shall decide this question by a majority vote.
The convening authority and boards of review are authorized specifically to
weigh the evidence and dismiss or reverse if they find the evidence is insuf-
ficient. CODE, Arts. 64, 66 (c).
Im (No. 45) 2 CMR 83 (1952).
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in his missing the shipment; and that an absence of from ten days to
two weeks would, with reasonable certainty, bring that result.
In this case the company commander testified that earmarked con-
tingents ordinarily cleared the pool within "ten tiays, two weeks or so."
The treatment given this testimony by the majority and the dissent di-
vulges an essential point of difference between them. The majority
stated that they found no evidence in the record to show that the
accused was aware of this procedure; whereas the dissenting judge was
of the opinion that one who had been at Fort Campbell for some time,
as had the accused, and one who had volunteered for overseas duty
and had been partially processed for such duty knew or should have
known the maximum time he could rely on between the time of selec-
tion for overseas duty and departure from the pool.
Another point of difference which developed in the Court was that
the majority did not regard shipment to the Far East Command as
having its "measurable origin" in the order transferring accused to a
replacement pool at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and that the necessary
subsequent steps for one to be sent overseas provided a lane in which
"there are just too many possible turnings . . . " The dissenting judge
disagreed on this point because he felt that once the journey was started
there was little likelihood that there would be any permanent interrup-
tion.
The Court heard oral arguments in Peterson23 and Ferrett,12 on
the same day. In each case the accused was found guilty by a court-
martial of desertion and the board of review had affirmed the finding.
The prosecution presented evidence of an unauthorized absence of
forty-six days in one case and forty-eight days in the other. In each
case the accused took the stand and undertook to explain his absence.
The only issue before the Court in these cases was whether the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding of intent to desert the military serv-
ice. In the Peterson case the conviction was reversed. The majority
found some evidence but not enough for the reason that it was as con-
sistent with innocence as with guilt. Judge Latimer concurred in the
result because he found the inference drawn by the court-martial was
"wholly unsupported by any evidence." In the Ferretti case the find-
ing of guilty was affirmed. The majority stated that they could not
believe that reasonable minds, as triers of fact, would be in agreement
that "reasonable hypotheses" other than guilt could be drawn from the
evidence. Judge Latimer concurred in the result without writing an
opinion.
The majority in the Ferretti case stated that the difference in result
... No. 199 (April 17, 1952).
"' No. 213 (April 18, 1952).
1952]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in these two cases was attributable to the differences in fact. In the
Peterson case this same majority had already announced:
" . . . in this area . . . the presence or absence of facts-or per-
haps even a single fact-may lead to divergent results.' 12
Judge Brosman wrote the opinion for the Court in both cases and
stated the essential differences of fact were as follows:
"In the Peterson case, the accused assigned as the explanation
for his unauthorized absence the fact that his parents had re-
ceived news of the death of his brother in Korea, and that he
wished to be near them in their grief. In the present case
[Ferretti], however, petitioner admitted that he was without
reason for his failure to return. His only explanation of the
lengthy absence was that it was "just one of those things."
Secondly, Peterson remained at his home of record during the
entire period of the offense, and thus could have been appre-
hended with ease and returned to military control. On the other
hand-although his home was in California-this accused spent
the period of his misconduct at various points along the eastern
seaboard. Finally, Peterson voluntarily returned to his station
and surrendered him'self, whereas Ferretti was arrested by
civilian authorities for vagrancy at a considerable distance from
his duty station. Accused stated that he was 'heading for base'
when picked up for vagrancy in Miami, Florida-apparently en




Prior to these decisions the Court had announced in the O'Neal
case that it would consider the testimony of the accused in testing the
sufficiency of the evidence. But a warning was subsequently given by
the Court to the effect that such testimony would not necessarily avoid
reasonable inferences arising from operative facts proposed or estab-
lished by the prosecution. It would be "merely one item to be con-
sidered with and in the light of all other evidence."'1 27 In reversing
the finding of desertion in the Peterson case the Court stated that a
"prominent factor" in their thinking was the uncontradicted and not
inherently improbable account given by the accused of his conduct and
motives. On the other hand, in sustaining the finding of desertion in
the Ferretti case the Court stated:
c*... in view of the Government's case and the very content of
the accused's own testimony-together with the inferences logi-
cally and reasonably teducible therefrom-the court-martial was
permitted to reject his denial of an intention to desert."'12
.. United States v. Peterson, No. 199 (April 17, 1952) adv. op. p. 4.'" United States v. Ferretti, No. 213 (April 18, 1952) adv. op. pp. 3, 4.
... United States v. Peterson, No. 199 (April 17, 1952) adv. op. p. 6.
... United States v. Ferretti, No. 213 (April 18, 1952) adv. op. p. 6.
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If the acc*used- testified that the. motive for his absence -was to attend
to family difficulties, the court-martial was not precluded from finding
he had an. iritent to- desert.- Nevertheless, these two cases illustrate
the value of this type of defense testimony. Both Peterson and Fer-
retti testified- they intended to return. Peterson further testified con-
cerning his family difficulties. Ferretti had no such testimony to offer.
This, together with the fact that Peterson voluntarily returned to the
service -whereas Ferretti was apprehended, was sufficient, in the opinion
of the Court, to justify the court-martial in believing Peterson's state-
ment that he intended to return and -disbelieving Ferretti's similar
statement.
In eight cases involving rape,129 robbery,130 manslaughter, 3 ' lar-
ceny and wrongful disposition,1 3 2  unpremeditated murder,'- as-
sault, 3 4 embezzlement 135 and failure to obey,136 respectively, the Court
was unanimous in upholding the evidence as sufficient to warrant a find-
ing of guilty. This result may be attributed to a combination of
factors including stronger prosecution evidence and the fact that the
area of disagreement between'.Judges Brosman and Quinn on one side
and Judge Latimer on the other concerning the proper method to test
the sufficiency of the evidence has not proven to be as great in practical
application' 37 as it appears in theory. However, the difference in
theory is still extant. In Horst,13s decided July 9, 1952, the accused,
a litter bearer, complained of sickness while serving in Korea. He was
ordered "back on the hill." To this command the accused replied:
"I can't make it, I won't go." In a per curiam opinion with Judge
Latimer not participating, the Court reversed a finding of guilt of the
offense of cowardly conduct on the ground that the evidence was in-
sufficient to support a finding of guilty of this offense. The Court
applied the test of sufficiency of the O'Neal case and cited no other
case in the opinion. Nevertheless, the fear entertained at one time
by Judge Latimer that the approach of his colleagues' in the O'Neal
129 United States v. Slozes (No. 12) 1 CMR 47 (1951).
1.. United States v. Jacobs (No. 152) 2 CMR 115 (1952).
... United States v. Riggleman, No. 195 (April 23, 1952).
"'1 United States v. Wooten, No. 369 (May 2, 1952). United States v. Grues-
chow, No. 294 (May 2, 1952) (companion case).
12. United States v. Jarvis, No. 94 (May 6, 1952).
124 United States v. Norton, No. 98 (June 2, 1952).
.. United States v. Valencia, No. 308 (June 3, 1952). Distinctions between
larceny and embezzlement do not exist in military law.
" United States v. Horst, No. 822 (July 9, 1952).
" Chief Judge Quinn would not have voted to affirm the conviction in the
McCrary case if he had agreed with the theory advanced 'by Judge Latimer. Judge
Latimer would have voted to affirm the conviction in the O'Neal case had the
majority applied his theory.
', 9 No. 822 (July 9, 1952).
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case would result-in the Court becoming another fact-finding body has
not materialized.139
The first two1 ° sufficiency cases came to the Court by way of a
certified question from the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force.
Subsequent cases came to it on the petition of the accused.
V. CONFESSIONS
A confession following inducements calculated to arouse either
hope 41 or fear is just as untrustworthy in a court-martial as it is in
a civilian criminal court. The Manual 142 provides that the burden is
on the prosecution to prove the voluntary nature of a confession. The
basic question is "whether the accused possessed, at the time of the
confession, 'mental freedom' to confess or deny participation in the
crime."'14  The issue of voluntariness is usually one of fact. And a
more difficult one where the confession in question is preceded, by
another, clearly involuntary, confession.
In Monge44 two soldiers, acting on suspicion, entered the barracks
of the accused and pulled him from bed at four o'clock in the morning.
He was forced to lie on the floor; a bayonet was held at his back and
after being questioned, he admitted the theft of money. During the
questioning one of the soldiers searched the clothes of the accused and
found large sums of money. On the afternoon of the same day, the
accused, after being advised of his right to remain silent, made a writ-
ten confession to Criminal Investigation Division agents. None of
those who were present at the time of the oral confession were present
at the interrogations. Four days later the accused executed a second
written confession in more detail.
The court-martial admitted the written confession and the accused
was found guilty of larceny. The Court outlined its scope of review
in the following language:
"To fulfill our appellate responsibility, it is incumbent upon us
to review independently the circumstances surrounding the al-
legedly involuntary confession. But where there is disagree-
ment as to whether claimed improper acts actually occurred or
where admitted facts permit different inferences, the trial forum
is not only better equipped but has the legal duty to weigh the
evidence and decide whether the confession is, in fact, volun-
" H. R. 8395 introduced in Congress on June 22, 1952 would authorize the
Court of Military Appeals to review controverted questions of fact.
"I United States v. McCrary (No. 4) 1 CMR 1 (1951) ; United States v. O'Neal
(No. 25) 2 CMR 44 (1952)." 'United States v. Webb (No. 370) 2 CMR 125 (1952).
"'Par. 140.
1"" United States v. Monge (No. 9) 2 CMR 1 (1952).
"' Ibid. Accord, United Sta*es v. Sapp (No. 14) 2 CMR 6 (1952); United
States v. Creamer, No. 179 (April 3, 1952) (unrequested disclosure in a friendly
and aimless conversation to an air policeman admissible).
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tary. We must accept the determination of the triers of fact on
the question of voluntariness whenever it is supported by sub-
stantial evidence, regardless of whether we, as individuals, might
resolve the conflict otherwise, or draw different inferences from
the facts. If the fact finders could reasonably conclude that the
confession was voluntary, then we must affirm."'14 5
The Court relied on United States v. Bayer,14 a decision of the
United States Supreme Court, in dealing with the rule, which, in effect,
states that the influence of a prior improper inducement is presumed to
continue during the subsequent confession until the prosecution estab-
lishes the contrary. According to the Court, the issue was still one of
fact and the prior confession was a "weighty" factor to be considered
with other things such as the mental character of the accused, the nature
and degree of the influence, the time intervening between the confessions
and all circumstances surrounding the subsequent confession. On the
basis of all the facts it was concluded that the triers of fact had reason-
able basis for finding that the prior improper influences had been dis-
pelled.
The Court refused to require, as had several prior decisions of
boards of review, that the accused be warned that prior involuntary
confessions could not be used against him. On this point, it is suf-
ficient that the accused be warned of his rights to remain silent.
An accused cannot legally be convicted upon his uncorroborated con-
fession or admission. 14 7 In Uchihar - 48 the Court considered the doc-
trine which requires corroborating evidence (corpus delicti) of a con-
fession. In this case Government counsel had argued that proof of
absence without leave was sufficient to corroborate the confession of
the accused of desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty. Judge
Brosman in writing the majority opinion with which Judge Latimer con-
curred did not deal with this contention. Instead, he assumed that
proper admission of the confession required evidence other than the
confession itself of every element of the charge of desertion. Looking
at the record he concluded that sufficient evidence was present in this
case inasmuch as the morning report (properly in evidence) revealed
the camp and unit to which the accused was assigned in Japan. The
court-martial with knowledge of the camp and unit could take judicial
notice that such unit was a "pipeline" for Korean combat. Judge
1 United States v. Monge (No. 9) 2 CMR 1 (1952). Accord, United States
v. Webb (No. 370) 2 CMR 125 (1952).
146 331 U.S. 532, 540-541 (1947) (six months between first and second con-
fessions).
1 MANUL, Par. 140a. United States v. Mounts (No. 73) 2 CMR 20 (1952);
United States v. Gordon (No. 258) 2 CMR 161 (1952). A confession of one ac-
cused cannot be considered against another accused. United States v. Wooten,
No. 369 (May 9, 1952).
14" (No. 60) 2 CMR 29 (1952).
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Latimer thought evidence in the record concerning efforts of the accused
to remain in Japan was sufficient -in itself to establish probable intent
not to go back to Korea. 
41
Chief Judge Quinn in a strong dissent met the contention of Gov-
ernment counsel squarely and stated that the Manual and the better
reasoned federal 'decisions are "irreconcilable with the Government
claim that the corpus delicti of desertion is made out solely by a show-
ing of the unauthorized absence alleged."'149 He referred to the majority
opinion as only "timidly" intimating instead of clearly recognizing that
the Manual requires corroboration of a pre-trial confession. More-
over, he strongly reiterated an objection, first made in his dissent in the
McCrary case, to stretching "the record to plug loop-holes in deficient
prosecution cases by the expedient of judicial notice."'150
Although the majority seem to think the requirement of corrobo-
rating evidence is really unnecessary if the rule demanding volition as
a condition to the admission of a confession is carefully enforced, it
appears likely that the Uchihara case has established the pattern to be
followed by the Court in future cases. Although an accused will not
be convicted on his uncorroborated confession, the quantum of evidence
necessary to meet the test of probability required by the Court is
small.151 The majority have twice announced that the record should
show what facts, if any, were judicially noticed by the court-martial.
It is reasonable to conclude the Court will insist that this requirement
be met in future cases.
VI. EVIDENCE
A. Hearsay
In Kellun;'52 an agent of the Criminal Investigation Division and
a sergeant were permitted to testify to a matter which another witness
(also an accused) had told them about the accused. This was clearly
hearsay. Was it prejudicial? The Court concluded that for all practical
purposes these witnesses were permitted to pyramid into great im-
portance the version offered by another accused and to do so was prej-
udicial where the facts, as here, were in dispute.
The general rule is that statements made through an interpreter
"9 Id. at 35.... Id. at 36. See United States v. Jackson (No. 141) 2 CMR 96 (1952) (ju-
dicial notice of record of trial by another court-martial).
1I The 1949 MANUAL required "substantial evidence." For cases applying
provisions of the 1949 MANUAL: United States v. Brooks (No. 18) 1 CMR 88
(1951) ; United States v. Goodman, No. 16 (February 11, 1952); United States
v. Evans (No. 143) 2 CMR 113 (1952). In United States v. Creamer, No .179
(April 3, 1952) it is stated: "His prolonged absence without leave--from Jan-
uary 17, 1946, to February 10,, 1951-together with the manner and place of its
termination, are factors from 'which the 'court could have reasonably inferred
the requisite intent toremain away permanently").
""No. 408 (July 25, 1952).
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may be proved only-by the testimony of the interpreter. The Court
stated there is a well recognized exception where.the interpreter may
be considered the agent of the person making the statement. In Plum-
mer 53 the alleged victim of rape reported to a medical doctor at an
Army aid station and made certain statements to the interpreter of the
doctor. Although the case was decided on other grounds, the Court
stated there were circumstances which would indicate that the inter-
preter was acting for both parties and thereby implied it would in
appropriate cases give recognition to the broadest view of the agency
doctrine.
(1) Spontaneous Exclainations
To qualify a spontaneous exclamation as an exception to the hear-
say rule, there must be other evidence of the event. In Mounts 5 4 the
mother of two small children testified concerning what her sons had
told her about the alleged offense of sodomy. Her testimony was hear-
say and it was not admissible as an exception to the rule on the ground
that the statements were spontaneous exclamations because the record
was totally devoid of other evidence of the shocking event.
(2) Dying Declarations
In DeCarlo'55 the accused asked a Korean boy, employed in the
service of supply, for some candy. He was told there was none and
a "good-natured argument in bantering words with no serious over-
tones" ensued. Finally the accused stated, "If you don't give me some
candy, I'll shoot you," or words to that effect. A shot from the rifle
of the accused hit the Korean. While in extremis, the boy stated that
it was an "accident." This statement was offered in evidence as a
dying declaration, but objection was made on the grounds that it was
opinion evidence and of such nature that the deceased could not have
so testified had he been living. The Court concluded that the opinion
rule -was not violated because the testimony was a "collective state-
ment of fact" based on the observations of the -deceased who was in
a position to know the circumstances of the shooting. Accordingly,
it was error not to have admitted the statement as a dying declaration.
(3) Official Documents
In Masusock' 56 the Court decided it was'desirable to announce the
principles governing the introduction in evidence of official military
documents. It reiterated a long recognized fact that morning reports
were official records and that extract copies properly authenticated by
the officer having custody thereof are properly admissible in evidence.
The Court then set forth the principles governing the signing and certi-
"y No. 235 (May 7, 1952). -'' (No.: 73) 2 CMR 20 (1952),
IZB (No. 73) 1 CMR 90 (1951). ... (No. 15) 1 CMR -32 (1951).
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fication of morning reports and concluded the commanding officer could
designate an officer who was not a member of the unit to sign the re-
ports. Further, it would be presumed that authority for another of-
ficer to sign the morning report was properly -delegated, hence affirma-
tive evidence need not appear in the record.OT One who challenges the
delegation must produce evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption
of- regularity. The Court has heldi s also that such delegation may
be made to a warrant officer.
In Parlier'59 the extract copy of the morning report failed to show
that it had ever been signed by anyone. The Court decided the pre-
sumption of regularity discussed in the Masusock case did not extend
to a presumption that the original entry was signed in accordance with
regulations. Without a signature the original was not an official docu-
ment and, therefore, an extract copy thereof was not admissible in evi-
dence.
Service records are official documents. Unlike the Army and Air
Force which use the morning report to show an unauthorized absence,160
the Navy relies on extracts from the service record for this purpose.101
In Harris"0 the law officer directed that certain extracts from the serv-
ice record be marked as exhibits. No objection was made by the defense
counsel; in fact, there was express consent. A Navy board of review
excluded the evidence on the ground that the record did not show it
actually was introduced in evidence. The Court reversed this finding
after deciding that the statement of the law officer may be construed
to be a reception in evidence of the questioned documents. To hold
otherwise, according to the Court, would be "to unduly emphasize form
over substance."
B. Searches and Seizures
In Doyle03 the Court noted that military law excludes from evidence
the products of "unlawful" searches. In testing the lawfulness of a
search the fundamental inquiry is whether the search was "unreason-
able." The Court recognized the power of a commanding officer to
search military property within his jurisdiction. This implied power
""1Accord, United States v. Lewandowski (No. 91) 1 CMR 40 (1951); United
States v. Flores (No. 75) 1 CMR 42 (1951).
18 United States v. Clements (No. 82) 1 CMR 39 (1951).
" No. 347 (June 13, 1952).
1"0 In United States v. Creamer, No. 179 (April 3, 1952) a morning report
dated 17 January 1947 was admissible to show the inception of an unauthorized
absence thirty days previous to that time. The Court held that it was a question
of weight and not admissibility.
... MANUAL, Par. 164a.
...No. 448 (June 11, 1952).
183 No. 1265 (May 20, 1952). In connection with the search of a private car
the Court applied the rule of Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947)
(exploratory searches).
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could be expressly delegated. The Court indicated but did not decide
that such power should be limited by a requirement that a reasonable
cause therefor be shown where there was. no express delegation. In-
asmuch as an eyewitness had informed the master-at-arms that the
accused had in his possession the clothing of another, he had reasonable
and probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed by
the accused.
C. Competency of Witness
In SlozesM a thirteen year old Korean girl upon being questioned
about her religion replied, "I have no religion." Instead of being af-
firmed she was sworn as a witness for the prosecution. The Court
took the position that the purpose of the oath was primarily a solemn
reminder to the witness of his special obligation to tell the truth and
concluded that the oath administered was sufficient to include the re-
quired affirmation. In respect to the competency of the child witness
the Court stated that the true test was intelligence and not age. The
'determination of competency is for the trial court and such finding
will not be disturbed on review unless it clearly appears that there was
an abuse of discretion or that the action was based on a mistake of law.
Although the Court was not "entirely satisfied" with the manner in
which the court-martial dealt with the questions of competency and
qualifications, it finally concluded that the record sufficiently revealed
the witness had an appreciation of the moral responsibility to speak the
truth.
VII. WAIVER
In Masusock16 5 the Court adopted the waiver rule announced by the
federal courts in cases in which error is asserted for the first time on
appeal. It was stated, in part, as follows:
"The admitted normal rule is that an appellate court will not
consider matters which are alleged as error for the first time on
appeal, and this is true of criminal as well as civil cases. How-
ever, an exception exists in criminal cases where the alleged
error would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, or would
seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.' 6 6
Applying this rule the Court has held that in the absence of an objec-
tion it will not review an assignment of error based on the inadmissi-
bility of evidence where it appears that the defense understood its right
to object and where it was inappropriate to apply the exception.
16 7
"' (No. 12) 1 CMR 47 (1951). 2 (No. 15) 1 CMR 32 (1951).
"'Ibid. Quoted by Court from Smith v. United States, 173 F. 2d 181, 184
(9th Cir. 1949).
..7 United States v. Masusock (No. 15) 1 CMR 32 (1951).
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Although the. Godelqs requires that the charges and specifications shall
be.signed by an officer of the armed forces authorized -to administer
oaths, it has been held that if charges are signed by an unauthorized
person 8 9 or not signed at all,1 70 such error is a defect in form rather
than substance. Hence, failure to object to this type of error con-
stitutes a waiver,
Perhaps the most significant development in applying the waiver
rule is concerned with the exception to the rule and the manner in
which it has been applied in cases involving errors by law officers. It
has been held that if the law'officer fails to instruct 7 1 the court-martial,
or if he fails to instruct it in appropriate lesser included offenses,17 2
or if he fails to instruct on all the essential elements of the offenses
alleged and embraced within the evidence, 1 73 the Court will consider
the error on appeal notwithstanding the fact that no objection or ex-
ception was taken to the errors by the defense. It is doubtful whether
the right of an accused to have the laW officer instruct the court-martial
is subject to waiver, inasmuch as a failure to give instructions at all
if the accused pleads not guilty constitutes a violation of " military
due process."'
1 74
With the exception of the few cases in which the Court has applied
"military due process" or "general" prejudice, as heretofore indicated,
a showing of specific prejudice is required. If the defense counsel
fails to object, the Court is under no'oligation to examine the facts
on review to determine whether prejudice resulted from the error. In
such case unless the effect of the error is obvious175 to the Court, failure
to object may result in a waiver -whereas if objection is properly made
the Court will examine the facts and may find prejudicial error. Proper
objection will protect the rights of: the accused and also will provide
ample opportunity for the error to be corrected and thereby avoid delay
inherent in a retrial or other subsequent proceeding.' 7"
The Court has hinted that it may be less lenient in overlooking
waiver for failure to object in respect to clarification of instructions,
theories of the parties, specific points developed through the evidence
and special defenses.
1 77
Several cases have followed the rulings announced in Lucas1 8 to
166 CODE, Art. 30a.
'e' United States v. May (No. 241) 2 CMR 80 (1952).
17 United States v. Marcy (No. 260) 2 CMR 82 (1952).
'x United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952).
. United States v. Clark (No. 190) 2 CMR-109 (1952).
United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952).
174 United States v. Clay (No. 49) 1 CMR 74 (1951).
1 United States v. Russell Williams (No. 133) 2 CMR 92 (1952).
Ibid.
, United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952).
178 (No. 7) 1 CMR 21- (1951).
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the effect thit if after a full and fair explanation of the effect of a plea
of guilty, the'accused insists on the plea, his rights.are not substantially
prejudiced by failure of the law officer -to instruct 179 the court-martial
or by failure of the president of the court-martial to close the court and
take a vote 80 on the question of guilt. The plea of guilty, in effect,
amounts to a waiver of rights provided in the Code.
An accused may waive right of counsel at the pre-trial investiga-
tion1 8 and the privilege against self-incrimination. 8 2  However, he
must be fully and adequately informed of those rights if his actions
are to be deemed a waiver.' 8 3 It is possible for an accused to waive
an objection to an investigating officer sitting as a member of the court-
martial.- Such waiver must be an express one and failure to challenge
when given an opportunity to do so does not constitute an express
waiver-at most, it is a mere failure to challenge.
8 4
VIII. PUNITIVE ARTICLES
Article 77.of the Code, which defines principals, was involved in
two cases. In Jacobs s5 the accused accompanied others in a breaking
and entering and participated in the assault which preceded the rob-
bery. The question was whether the accused was an aider and abettor
and hence a principal to the robbery offense. The Court made it clear
that presence was not enough and guilt by association must be avoided.
But here the evidence was sufficient to justify the court-martial in in-
ferring that the accused -shared a common purpose in the robbery. In
Wootew' 86 the- accused wy as not present during the commission of the
offense. The Court found that he had counseled the other accused.
Consequently he was guilty as an accessory before the fact at common
law and therefore a principal under Article 77.
In Jackson87 the accused was tried by a summary court-martial
in Taegu, Korea, for a minor offense. During the trial he did not dis-
close that he was absent without leave. Subsequently, the accused was
tried for absence without leave and it was contended on his behalf that
the temporary exercise of military control by the summary court-martial
171 United States v. Bishop (No. 37) 1 CMR 29 (1951); United States v.
O'Brassill (No. 52) 1 CMR 27 (1951); United States v. Jones, No. 426 (April
4, 1952); United States v. Zimmerman (No. 261) 2 CMR 66 (1952).
18 United States v. Goodrich (No. 36) 1 CMR 26 (1951).
.8 United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952).
"'United States v. Welch, No. 196 (May 27, 1952).
.8 Ibid. United States v. Rhoden (No. 153) 2 CMR 99 (1952).
8' United States v. Bound (No. 201) 2 CMR 130 (1952). The Court was re-
luctant to find waiver because this may not have been a question of challenge but
rather a flat statutory rule of disqualification.
188 (No. 152) 2 CMR 115 (1952).
188 No. 369 (May 2, 1952).
187 (No. 141) 2 CMR'96 (1952); United States v. Branch (No. 131) 2 CMR
95 (1952).
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terminated the unlawful absence. The Court decided that the unlawful
absence would not terminate unless the accused disclosed his status or
the military authorities could by reasonable diligence obtain knowledge
of his true status. Since neither had occurred in this case the conviction
was affirmed.
In Brooks s8 it was held that the existence or non-existence of a
state of hostilities is not a necessary element of the offense of desertion
and need not be specifically alleged.
Article 92 (1) makes it an offense to violate or fail to obey any
lawful general order or regulation. Neither the Code nor Manual ex-
pressly state that knowledge (actual or constructive) of the order or
regulation is an essential element of the offense. In Snyde$a8 9 the
accused was alleged to have failed to obey a camp regulation. The
Court interpreted "general order or regulation" to include orders rang-
ing from those issued, by a Department down to and including those
promulgated by the commander of a post, ship or station. The question
then arose whether knowledge on the part of the accused was an element
of the offense. The Court decided that it was unnecessary to allege
knowledge of the camp regulation but that such knowledge was an
element which had to be proved during the trial. In another case the
Court held the same requirement was applicable to a post 19 0 regulation.
In the Snyder case there was also the question whether a specification
which alleged the accused did "wrongfully and unlawfully attempt to
entice [name of person] to engage in sexual intercourse with a female
to be directed to him by the said Snyder" was sufficient to allege an
offense under Article 134. In reversing the board of review the Court
stated that although simple fornication may not be an offense in military
law, it does not follow that enticement or an attempt to enticement may
not be. In this case the accused was charged with three such attempts
and his conduct was prejudicial to good order and discipline. A solici-
tation' 91 to make a false statement in a pre-trial investigation and re-
ceiving1 92 stolen property of the United States with knowledge of its
character were also held to constitute conduct prejudicial to good order
and diiscipline and were consequently a violation of Article 134. In
.. (No. 18) 1 CMR 88 (1951). "8"No. 409 (June 5, 1952).
... United States v. Wade, No. 586 (July 11, 1952). These cases are con-
sistent with the MANUAL Paragraph 154 (4) which requires knowledge either
actual or constructive of any regulation or directive of any command inferior
to the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force, or the Headquarters of the
Marine Corps or Coast Guard, or inferior to the headquarters of a territorial,
theater or similar area command. Although Article 87 (missing movement) does
not appear to require knowledge on the part of the accused, the Court appears to
have made it an element. United States v. Jones, No. 426 (April 4, 1952).
"'1 United States v. Isbell (No. 21) 2 CMR 37 (1952).
"' United States v. Hernadon, No. 570 (July 17, 1952) (although an offense
may be laid as a crime or offense not capital, it does not have to be).
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Marker93 another clause of Article 134 was involved. A civilian em-
ployee of the armed services, who was supervisor of a Japanese Cor-
poration operated under the direction of the Army, used his official
position to secure gifts from the Japanese owners of the plant. His
conduct was determined to be of such nature as to bring discredit upon
the armed services and he was therefore guilty of violating Article 134.
IX. PROVING PRIOR CONVICTIONS
After verdict and before sentence, the trial counsel introduces evi-
dence of any previous conviction of the accused by a court-martial
which has occurred during the current enlistment'94 and during the
three years next preceding the commission of any offense of which
the accused stands convicted. Proof of two prior convictions operates
to increase the maximum authorized punishment which a court-martial
may give in certain cases.9 5 For example, a dishonorable discharge
or bad conduct discharge is not a permissible sentence if the accused
has been convicted of absence without leave for less than sixty days
but when there is proof of two prior convictions a bad conduct dis-
charge is authorized.
In Carter'95 the accused pleaded guilty to a charge of absence with-
out leave for five days. After a finding of guilty had been voted, the
trial counsel made -a detailed unsworn statement concerning two pre-
vious convictions. On being asked if there was any objection to the
statement of the trial counsel, the defense counsel replied in the nega-
tive. No further effort was made to prove the two prior convictions.
The court-martial accepted the oral statement of trial counsel and
rendered a sentence which, unless the evidence of prior convictions
could properly be considered, was in excess of the maximum permitted
by the Manual and accordingly prejudicial.
The procedure outlined in the Manual for proving prior convictions
is susceptible to two interpretations. One would permit the trial coun-
'"3 No. 281 (May 19, 1952).
.. MANUAL, Par. 75b provides "The evidence must, however, relate to offenses
committed during a *current enlistment, voluntary extension of enlistment, ap-
pointment, or other engagement or obligation for service of the accused, and
during the three years next preceding the commission of any offense of which the
accused stands convicted."
'"
5 MANUAL, Par. 127c, section b.
... No. 159 (January 18, 1952). Several subsequent cases have similarly re-
versed the board of review when it has failed to find reversible error. United
States v. Trimiar (No. 413) 2 CMR 169 (1952) ; United States v. Schabel, No.
440 (March 28 1952) ; United States v. Adams, No. -452 (April 3, 1952) ; United
States v. Prunchniewski, No. 489 (April 18, 1952) ; United States v. DeWeese,
No. 633 (May 23, 1952) ; United States v. Townsend, No. 597 (June 23, 1952) ;
United States v. Hand, No. 450 (April 14, 1952). Unlike prior cases in that
only one previous conviction was involved and accused was tried for an offense
for which a bad conduct discharge was authorized without consideration of prior
offenses.
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sel, as in the Carter case, to relate the prior convictions to the court-
martial and any further effort to prove such convictions is required only
if the accused objects. Another interpretation would require that the
trial counsel introduce in evidence competent proof of prior convic-
tions such as the service record or. extract copy thereof or the order
publishing the result of trial after'he had recited the prior convictions
to the court-martial whether the accused objected or not. The Court
chose the latter interpretation and held that in all cases the accused
is entitled to have introduced in the iecord competent evidence of pre-
vious convictions. In order to avbid any tendency on the part of t1e
trial counsel to forget to offer the exhibit after he had read it, the
Court suggested that a departure from the sequence of events as out-
lined in the Manual would be helpful:
"As a matter of practice, it would appear to be more desirable
to have the document marked as an exhibit, shown to the accused,
its admissibility determined; and if admitted in evidence, then
permit the trial counsel to' read it to the court .... ,,10T
Although the Court offered as one of its objections to the procedure
in the Carter case the fact that the record would not contain evidence
for examination by the Court on appeal, it also held'0 8 that such erro-
neous procedure would not be cured by merely attaching a copy of pre-
vious cbnvictions to the record inasmuch as it had no way of knowing
that the appended material was the source from which the trial counsel
read to the court-martial. On the other hand, where evidence of prior
convictions had properly been introduced, the Court did not consider it
fatal error because the record failed to reveal that the defense actually
saw the documents.'0 9
Although unsworn testimony 200 of trial counsel is not sufficient to
prove prior convictions, sworn testimony should be permitted as a
primary source of proof. But if sworn testimony merely gives the con-
tents of documents it is necessary to show that these documents were
executed in substantial compliance with the rules and regulations appli-
cable to documentary evidenceY° ' Sworn testimony of the trial coun-
sel is not mandatory either as a primary source of proof, or as a neces-
sary predicate to documentary evidence.
20 2
In Jones203 the court-martial disregarded the ruling of the law of-
.ficer .which had excluded one of the two prior convictions offered in
... United States v. Carter (No. 159) 2 CMR 14 (1952).
... United States v. Zimmerman (No. 261) 2 CMR 66 (1952).
... United States v. Castillo, No. 449 (May 2, 1952).
"' United States v. Carter (No. 159) 2 CMR 14 (1952).
301 Ibid. See MANUAL, Par. 143a for procedure in proving the contents of a
writing.
United States v. Castillo, No. 449 (May 2, 1952).
205 United States v. Jones, No. 79 (April 14, 1952).
[Vol. '31
THE COURT OF MILITARY APPEAL
evidence by the trial counsel. 'The law officer had been incorrect in
his ruling. The Court, in a divided opinion, considered the action of
the reviewing authorities which reduced the sentence from tweinty-
five to ten years as sufficient to cure the prejudicial effect of improper
consideration of the prior offense after it had been excluded by the
law officer. Inasmuch as Chief Judge Quinn concurred in the result
and Judge Brosman dissented, it is extremely doubtful whether the
Court will give its unqualified approval to a practice in the Army which
permitted reviewing authorities to cure the .prejudicial effect of an im-
proper consideration of prior offenses by reducing the sentence ad-
judged by the court-martial.
In Yerger20 4 proof of prior convictions came before the Court in
a setting different from that heretofore discussed. Over defense
objection the trial counsel elicited from witnesses evidence of previous
convictions of the accused. The Court applied the general rule that
evidence of other misconduct is generally not admissible against the
accused. None of the exceptions to the rule were present in the case
and hence the rights of the accused were thereby prejudiced.
Reversible error could, but not necessarily, result from the trial
counsel asking questions relating to prior convictions even though proof
was not permitted in evidence. 20 5 - In this situation the Court will look
to see if the conduct of trial counsel indicates an intent to disregard
deliberately the rules of evidence in order to influence the court-martial
as distinguished from a mere error of judgment; and secondly, whether
the improper remarks could have reasonably affected the deliberations of
the court-martial. The Court further stated that even if both of these
tests are satisfied, there may be convincing evidence of guilt, which
would negate the effect of prejudice.
2 0 6
X. PUNISHMENT
Although the Court cannot increase the severity of a sentence af-
firmed by a board of review, -2° T it does have authority to review a sen-
tence for the purpose of 'determining whether it exceeds the maximum
legal limits.208 In Downard2° 9 an officer was tried under the Code for
the offense of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. The
offense had occurred when the Articles of War were in effect. The pun-
ishment under the Articles of War 210 for such offense was mandatory
20, No. 122 (April 7, 1952) (decided on other grounds).
25 United States v. Valencia, No. 308 (June 3, 1952) (Court found a possible
mistake of judgment).
200 Ibid.
° United States v. Gilgallon (No. 286) 2 CMR 170 (1952).
... United States v. Keith, No. 226 (July 3, 1952).
200 No. 266 (April 28, 1952).
210 Article of War 95.
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dismissal from the service whereas the Code permits punishment within
the discretion of the court-martial. 211 A Presidential Executive Or-
der2 12 provides that if the maximum punishment prescribed by the Code
is less than that fixed by the Articles of War, and if the offense oc-
curred under the Articles of War but is tried under the Code, the new
and not the old maximum punishment is applicable. Notwithstanding
this Order the law officer instructed the court-martial that the manda-
tory punishment was dismissal. The Court found this instruction con-
stituted prejudicial error and reversed. In this case the law officer
could have correctly instructed the court-martial that they might assess
punishment at their discretion, not in excess of dismissal.
Although the Manual 213 requires a forfeiture of pay to be stated
in terms of dollars and cents, the Court held that this requirement is
to simplify bookkeeping. Therefore, a sentence such as forfeiture of
two-thirds pay per month for two months is a valid sentence2 1 4 be-
-cause it can be reduced to dollars and cents by easy computation.
A court-martial is not authorized to adjudge close order drill as
punishment, but a commanding .officer may order additional drill as
a corrective for apparent want of discipline and lack of self-control as
long as the purpose of such drill is training and not punishment.215
A court-martial may not adjudge confinement at hard labor for
more than six months, forfeiture of pay at a rate greater than two-
thirds of the monthly pay of an accused or a forfeiture of pay in an
amount greater than two-thirds of his pay for six months without also
including in the sentence a punitive discharge.210 The Court held 21
-that this provision is not violated where a convening authority sus-
pended a bad conduct discharge and ordered into execution the re-
mainder of the sentence which included total forfeitures and confine-
ment for ten months. This result was predicated on the reasoning that
the punitive discharge was still a part of the sentence even though it
has been suspended.
XI. SUMMARY
In the one hundred and eight cases 218 herein considered the majority
211 CODE, Art. 133.
212Executive Order, February 8, 1951, MANUAL, p. IX.
.1 MANUAL, Par. 126h (1).
21 United States v. Gilgallon (No. 286) 2 CMR 170 (1952).
21 United States v. Trani, No. 106 (April 9, 1952).
2. MANUAL, Par. 127b.
27 United States v. Phillips, No. 389 (May 1, 1952).
21 THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR THE PERIOD MAY
31, 1951 TO MAY 31, 1952 states that 814 cases were docketed from August 1951
through May 1952. 559 of these cases were completed prior to May 31, 1952.
There was a written opinion in eighty-nine of the completed cases. This REPORT
gives a detailed breakdown on the disposition of cases.
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opinions were written as follows: Judge Brosman-thirty three; Chief
Judge Quinn-thirty two; and Judge Latimer-thirty one. The re-
maining twelve were per curiam opinions. There were only eight dis-
senting opinions. Seventy six cases came to the Court on petition.
The other thirty two cases were before the Court on questions certified
by the Judge Advocates General as follows: Navy-twenty eight; Air
Force-three; and one from the General Counsel of the Treasury De-
partment (Coast Guard case). The Court affirmed the boards of review
in fifty per cent of the cases and reversed219 the other half either in
whole or in part.
.1 Several cases were reversed on the same point of law.
